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Do Disclosures of Customer Metrics  
Lower Investors’ and Analysts’ Uncertainty, But Hurt Firm Performance? 
 
Abstract 
Investors, analysts, and regulators frequently advocate greater disclosure of non-financial infor-
mation, such as customer metrics. Managers, however, argue that such metrics are costly to re-
port, reveal sensitive information to competitors, and therefore will lower future cash-flows. To 
examine these counter arguments, this study presents the first empirical examination of the prev-
alence and consequences of backward- and forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics by 
manually coding 511 annual reports of firms in two industries, Telecommunications (365 re-
ports) and Airlines (146 reports). The results reveal significant heterogeneity in the disclosure of 
customer metrics across firms and between industries. On average, in both industries, firms make 
more backward-looking than forward-looking disclosures. Interestingly, forward-looking disclo-
sures of customer metrics are negatively associated with investors’ uncertainty in both industries, 
and with analysts’ uncertainty in the Telecommunications industry. Importantly, results do not 
support the managerial thesis that such disclosures have a negative impact on future cash-flows. 






Over the last decade a large number of marketing scholars have recommended that publicly 
listed firms should provide more disclosures of customer metrics (e.g., Chakravarty and Grewal 
2011, p. 1607; Wiesel, Skiera, and Villanueva 2008, p. 1). In fact, an MSI report concludes: 
“We advocate expanding and formalizing disclosures of marketing-related activities and 
performance drivers. We argue that expanded mandatory disclosure is a feasible first 
step toward improving financial reporting.” (Mizik and Nissim 2011, p. 1). 
Indeed, the Marketing Accountability Standards Board (MASB) has repeatedly called for more 
disclosures of marketing activities and outcomes (Gregory and Moore 2013; Stewart and Gugel 
2016). Despite multiple calls, there exists no empirical research that examines whether and to 
what extent firms disclose customer metrics. Accordingly, the first objective of this study is to 
empirically examine the prevalence of disclosures of customer metrics by publicly listed firms.  
Interestingly, in 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) proposed man-
datory disclosure of several customer metrics such as the number of current customers and prof-
itability per customer in its project “Disclosure of Information about Intangible Assets Not Rec-
ognized in Financial Statements” (FASB 2001). However, this proposal was met with strong re-
sistance from managers who argued that disclosures of such metrics were not useful for inves-
tors. In addition, the managers argued that such disclosures are costly to implement and reveal 
sensitive information to competitors resulting in lower future financial performance. As noted by 
a manager at The Business Roundtable:  
“We do not support quantitative disclosure requirements because it would require sub-
stantial resources to capture and value intangible assets that would not be useful to in-
vestors and could cause competitive harm.” (Raines 2001, p. 2) 
Following these objections, the FASB closed this project in 2004 (FASB 2004). How-
ever, prior research has not explored whether disclosures of customer metrics by firms are useful 
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for investors and analysts, and if they have a negative effect on firms’ future financial perfor-
mance. Accordingly, the second objective of this study is to examine these outcomes of disclo-
sures of customer metrics. The study seeks to make three contributions:  
First, using hand-coded data we present the first empirical examination of disclosures of 
34 customer metrics for firms in two industries, Telecommunications (Telecom) and Airlines. 
We articulate the difference between backward- and forward-looking disclosures of customer 
metrics and underscore the importance of doing so. The study, therefore, is responsive to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s emphasis on forward-looking disclosures, that is, 
disclosures of managers’ expectations about future actions or outcomes (see SEC 1989, 2003). In 
both industries we find that firms make more backward- than forward-looking disclosures of cus-
tomer metrics. In addition, Telecom firms disclose more customer metrics than Airlines. The em-
pirical examination, therefore, provides a more nuanced insight into both the quantity and the 
types of disclosures of customer metrics in two industries.  
Second, we propose and test hypotheses about the outcomes of the quantity of backward- 
and forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics. We find that the quantity of forward-look-
ing disclosures of customer metrics is negatively associated with the uncertainty faced by inves-
tors in both industries. We also find that quantity of forward-looking disclosures of customer 
metrics is negatively associated with analysts’ uncertainty for Telecom firms. As such, the study 
identifies forward-looking disclosures of customer outcome metrics as “…the critical marketing 
information elements that should be made available to investors” (Srinivasan and Hanssens 
2009, p. 308). Importantly, these results lend empirical support for recommendations by MASB 
about the usefulness of marketing disclosures in annual reports for investors (see Stewart and 
Gugel 2016). Additional analyses also show that the impact of forward-looking disclosures of 
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customer metrics is due to disclosures of metrics that focus on customer outcomes (e.g., cus-
tomer satisfaction, customer retention rate) rather than firm actions (e.g., marketing spending, 
advertising spending).  
Third, in contrast to managerial objections, we find no support for the argument that 
greater backward- or forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics have a negative impact on 
future financial performance. Given that forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics lower 
investors’ and analysts’ uncertainty, but do not have a negative impact on firms’ future financial 
performance, suggests that perhaps FASB should re-consider the decision to terminate its project 
encouraging disclosures of intangibles metrics (see FASB 2001, 2004).  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
In their seminal work, Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey (1998) propose that marketing assets and 
actions are important for senior managers and the investment community because they have an 
impact on future cash-flows. Consequently, a large body of work in marketing examines the fi-
nancial impact of marketing assets and actions, as reflected in firms’ performance with custom-
ers or actions directed towards customers (see Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). Interestingly, 
many studies in this domain argue for more disclosures of customer metrics that reflect firms’ 
performance with its customers and its actions targeting customers. For example, Mizik and 
Jacobson (2008, p. 29) present strong arguments for more disclosures of customers’ brand per-
ceptions. Related to firms’ actions, Chakravarty and Grewal (2011, p. 1607) call for more disclo-
sures of firms’ advertising and R&D spending (also see Hanssens, Rust, and Srivastava 2009, p. 
118; Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009, p. 184; Wiesel, Kräussl, and Srivastava 2012, p. 5-6).  
These repeated calls are based on the thesis that more disclosures of customer metrics 
will lower investors’ and analysts’ uncertainty about the future financial performance of the firm. 
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Indeed, Srinivasan and Hanssens (2009, p. 118) conclude in their review of this literature that 
“marketing managers need to generate better information about their intangibles (e.g., invest-
ments in brand building, product and service innovations, R&D) and the benefits that flow from 
them to give investors a sharper picture of the company’s performance outlook.”  
From a regulatory perspective, these calls for more disclosures of customer metrics can 
be viewed as calls for more “disclosure of non-financial information”. Disclosure of non-finan-
cial information by publicly listed firms is of fundamental interest to regulatory bodies such as 
the SEC and FASB (Healy and Palepu 2001). This interest occurs because disclosure of non-fi-
nancial information by managers provides a clearer picture of the prospects of the firm to inves-
tors and also allows them to monitor the use of their capital by managers (Beyer et al. 2010). Im-
portantly, prior work in marketing and the literature on disclosures offer three key insights that 
are relevant in studying the disclosure of customer metrics. 
First, disclosures of non-financial information lower analysts’ and investors’ uncertainty 
if they provide information about future cash-flows of the firm above and beyond the infor-
mation provided by financial metrics (see Beyer et al. 2010; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 
1998). An important corollary of this thesis is that if disclosures of non-financial information are 
important, then greater quantity of such disclosures will lower analysts’ and investors’ uncer-
tainty about future cash-flows (see Han and Tan 2010). Accordingly a number of studies exam-
ine how analysts’ and investors’ uncertainty are a function of non-financial disclosures such as 
R&D (e.g., Jones 2007; Merkley 2014), environmental actions (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, 
and Hughes 2004), and corporate social responsibility (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2011, 2012). There-
fore, in developing our hypotheses, we focus on the effect of quantity of disclosures of customer 
metrics on investors’ and analysts’ uncertainty. 
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Second, disclosure of non-financial information can be classified into backward- and for-
ward-looking disclosures (e.g., Beyer et al. 2010; Matsumoto, Pronk, and Roelofsen 2011). 
Backward-looking disclosures provide information related to firms’ performance or actions that 
have already taken place, but are being disclosed for the first time to investors. A typical exam-
ple of a backward-looking disclosure would be firms’ disclosures of earnings per share in the re-
cently concluded fiscal year. An example of a backward-looking disclosure of a customer metric 
(i.e., customer acquisition costs) by a telecom firm would be:  
Ubiquitel Inc (2003): Cost Per Gross Addition (CPGA) was approximately $450 for the 
year ended December 31, 2003 which is comparable to approximately $444 for the year 
ended December 31, 2002.  
Forward-looking disclosures provide information about the managers’ expectations of a 
firm’s actions or performance (Muslu et al. 2014). A typical example of a forward-looking dis-
closure would be the earnings per share guidance or revenue estimates provided by a firm for the 
next fiscal year. An example of a forward-looking disclosure of a customer metric (e.g., cus-
tomer acquisition cost) would be:  
Ubiquitel Inc (2003): We believe that CPGA will remain at approximately current levels in 
the near-term due to significant competition coupled with our commitment to quality sub-
scriber additions. 
It is important to note that both backward- and forward-looking disclosures provide information 
to investors and analysts for the first time. The difference is that the former represents what has 
already happened, whereas the latter represents managers’ expectations about the future and is 
also being disclosed to the investors and analysts for the first time. Securities regulations also re-
flect the distinction between backward- and forward-looking disclosures. Specifically, on De-
cember 22, 1995, United States Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA) to lower the litigation risk for making forward-looking disclosures (Johnson, Kasznik, 
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and Nelson 2000). In addition, both the SEC and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) have repeatedly emphasized the need for more forward-looking disclosures as they are 
helpful for investors (see IASB 2010; SEC 1989, 2003).  
Therefore, in this study, we consider the quantity of both backward- and forward-looking 
disclosures of customer metrics. We define the quantity of backward-looking disclosures of cus-
tomer metrics as the amount of information released by the firm that reflects prior actions of the 
firm directed towards customers or the firm’s prior performance with customers. As such, a firm 
providing information about its customer churn in the annual report for the recently completed 
fiscal year is an example of a backward-looking disclosure of a customer metric.  
Quantity of forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics, in turn, refers to the amount 
of information released by the firm that reflects managers’ expectations of the firm’s future ac-
tions directed towards customers or its future performance with customers. Therefore, a firm 
providing information about its expectations of customer churn in the coming fiscal year in its 
annual report is an example of a forward-looking disclosure of a customer metric. 
Third, disclosure of non-financial information is not costless for firms because they might 
incur proprietary costs (Berger and Hann 2007), defined as the costs that incur because disclo-
sures provide sensitive information to competitors (Verrecchia 1983). Competitors, in turn, may 
use this information to their advantage resulting in poor subsequent financial performance of the 
disclosing firm (Berger 2011). As such, it is important to understand whether there are proprie-
tary costs associated with more disclosures of customer metrics. Therefore, we develop hypothe-
ses about the effects of the quantity of backward- and forward-looking disclosures of customer 
metrics on firm’s future financial performance. 
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HYPOTHESES 
Backward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics 
Literature in marketing provides robust arguments for the usefulness of backward-looking dis-
closures of customer metrics for both investors and analysts (e.g., Aaker and Jacobson 2001; 
Mizik and Jacobson 2008). The underlying logic is that information pertaining to these metrics 
allows investors and analysts to better predict future cash-flows of the firm. For example, be-
cause customer satisfaction leads to higher loyalty and share of wallet, information about current 
customer satisfaction levels improves investors’ and analysts’ prediction of future cash flows 
(see Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009). Indeed, customer metrics, such as customers’ retention rate can 
be helpful in better predicting a firm’s future cash flows (see Schulze, Skiera, and Wiesel 2012). 
Given that backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics are likely to be useful in 
assessing the future cash-flows, analysts and investors following a firm that provides greater 
quantity of such disclosures will have better understanding about its future cash-flows. Conse-
quently, we expect that analysts’ and investors’ uncertainty about future cash-flows of a firm will 
be lower for firms that provide greater quantity of backward-looking disclosures of customer 
metrics: 
H1: The greater the quantity of backward-looking disclosures of customer met-
rics, the lower the (a) analysts’ and (b) investors’ uncertainty about the fu-
ture cash-flows of the firm. 
Forward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics 
Both the SEC and FASB argue that disclosures based on “…expectations of the future are inher-
ently more relevant to investment decision-making than disclosures based on historical 
measures” (Peters 2014). The reason is that forward-looking disclosures provide investors and 
analysts with insights about the future actions and expectations of managers and their outcomes 
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(see Muslu et al. 2015). Indeed, empirical studies show that forward-looking disclosures of earn-
ings lower investors’ and analysts’ uncertainty (e.g., Hussainey, Schleicher, and Walker 2003; 
Hussainey and Walker 2009). 
To the extent that customer metrics provide information above and beyond financial met-
rics, it can be argued that forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics provide valuable in-
formation to investors and analysts. Consider the disclosure by Continental Airlines about its in-
tended improvement of customer service with the goal of being ranked in the top three airlines in 
terms of on-time flights, rate of missing bags, and customer complaints (Continental Airlines 
Annual Report 1995). This disclosure presents valuable information for both analysts and inves-
tors because better service quality is likely to increase customer retention, customers’ share of 
wallet with the firm, and therefore the future cash-flows of the firm (see Fornell et al. 2006).  
Prior literature in marketing also suggests that forward-looking disclosures of customer 
metrics allow investors to anticipate future cash-flows. For example, Sorescu, Shankar, and 
Kushwaha (2007) find that investors consider announcements of future product launches to draw 
conclusions about future cash-flows of a firm. Taken together, we expect that firms that provide 
greater quantity of forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics will lower investors’ and an-
alysts’ uncertainty about its future cash-flows. Formally: 
H2: The greater the quantity of forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics, 
the lower the (a) analysts’ and (b) investors’ uncertainty about the future 
cash-flows of the firm. 
 
Future Financial Performance 
Managers frequently argue that greater disclosures of customer metrics have an adverse effect on 
a firm’s future cash-flows. This concern stems from the argument that backward- and forward-
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looking disclosures of customer metrics impose significant proprietary costs on firms as they re-
veal important information to competitors (see for example, Dedman and Lennox 2009; Li 
2010). Competitors, in turn, can use such information to their advantage, which results in a lower 
future financial performance of the disclosing firm. As noted by a manager:  
“We would also point out that disclosing the existence of competitive advantages, proprie-
tary information, or other intangibles actually has the potential of damaging the business 
enterprise.” (Graham 2001, p. 2, in response to FASB 2001) 
In addition, managers argue that providing greater amount of backward- and forward-looking 
disclosures of customer metrics imposes significant costs related to collection, analysis, and re-
porting of these metrics. As noted by a manager: 
“While we believe it will not be feasible to develop relevant information, we expect the po-
tential cost to a large, complex entity of monitoring, capturing, valuing and reporting such 
information would be significant.” (Richter 2001, p. 2) 
In summary, the managerial thesis asserts that more backward- and forward-looking disclosures 
of customer metrics are likely to incur significant proprietary and compliance costs resulting in 
lower future financial performance. Therefore, the managerial thesis is: 
H3a: The greater the quantity of backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics 
made by a firm, the lower the future cash-flows of the firm. 
H3b: The greater the quantity of forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics made 
by a firm, the lower the future cash-flows of the firm. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data 
Prior studies that use hand-coded data to examine non-financial disclosures by publicly listed 
firms typically focus on one industry because disclosure practices and their consequences are 
likely to be industry-specific (see Bhojraj, Blacconiere, and D'Souza 2004; Botosan 1997). We 
complement prior studies by examining disclosures of customer metrics by firms in two different 
industries, the Telecom industry (Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] 4812 and 4813) and 
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the Airlines industry (SIC 4512). Customer metrics are widely tracked and firms typically main-
tain large customer databases in both of these industries (Bryan 2014; Noyes 2014). As such, in-
formation about customer metrics is likely to be particularly informative not only for analysts 
and investors, but also for competitors.  
However, the two industries differ significantly in their size. For example, in 2012, US-
based Telecom firms had total revenues of $928 billion and a total market capitalization of $1.18 
trillion. In contrast, the US-based Airlines had total revenues of $327 billion and a total market 
capitalization of $92 billion. In addition, the focus on these two industries allows us to analyze 
whether the prevalence and consequences of disclosures of customer metrics vary between an 
industry with contractual customer relationships, i.e., Telecom, and an industry without these, 
i.e., Airlines (also see Reinartz and Kumar 2003).  
We draw on four data sources. Starting with the Compustat data base, we first identified 
all publicly listed firms in the two industries from 1994-2011 from SIC codes 4812, 4813 (Tele-
com) and 4512 (Airlines). Within this sample, we focus only on firms that end their fiscal year at 
December 31st. This focus is important as we have to ensure that the term “year” is the same for 
all the firms in our sample and therefore all firms were subject to the same industry conditions 
and that analysts had access to the same microeconomic and industry data during the sample pe-
riod (e.g., Dao, Raghunandan, and Rama 2012; Jones 2007; Loh and Mian 2006).1 This proce-
dure yields two unbalanced panel data sets of 365 firm-year observations from Telecom and 146 
firm-year observations from Airlines (see Web Appendix A for the list of firms included).  
                                                 
1 Jones (2007, p.494) provides the following example to illustrate why the exclusion of firms with fiscal year endings other than 
December 31st is crucial: “If an industry-wide event occurred in March 1998 that affected all firms, such as a price increase, then 
a firm might disclose information about it. This would be a fiscal-year 1997 disclosure for a March year-end firm, but not a De-
cember year-end firm. However, the price increase would impact analysts’ forecasts of both firms.” 
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Second, for each of these firms, we retrieved the 10-K report from the website of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov). Third, we matched the resulting sample with 
historical data on analysts’ earnings forecasts using the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S). Since we require at least 2 analyst earnings forecasts to measure analysts’ uncertainty 
about future firm’s performance, we excluded all observations for which less than 2 analyst earn-
ings forecasts were available. Finally, we used University of Chicago’s CRSP data set to obtain 
daily stock returns, whose standard deviation is our measure of investors’ uncertainty. This 
alignment across four databases resulted in 192 firm-year observations for Telecom and 95 firm-
year observations for Airlines. The resulting sample is favorable when compared to prior studies 
that use hand-coded data to measure disclosures (e.g., 81 observations in Bhojraj, Blacconiere, 
and D'Souza 2004; 119 observations in Jones 2007). 
Measures 
Customer Metrics Disclosure Score. We follow prior research and use hand-coded data to 
construct disclosure scores that measure the quantity of backward- and forward-looking disclo-
sures of customer metrics made by each firm in every year (e.g., Bhojraj, Blacconiere, and 
D'Souza 2004; Jones 2007). We started by identifying all customer metrics that are likely to pro-
vide useful information for analysts and investors. Accordingly, we reviewed all articles pub-
lished from 1993-2012 in four leading marketing journals (Journal of Marketing, Journal of 
Marketing Research, Marketing Science, and Management Science). If a customer metric had an 
effect (empirically or conceptually) on firms’ future financial performance (e.g., cash-flows, 
stock returns, risk, shareholder value, Tobin’s q), then we considered it in our disclosure score.  
In total, we identified 31 customer metrics. Thus, we followed FASB’s advice to aim for 
a broad instead of restrictive disclosure approach (FASB 2001). Specifically,  
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“As pointed out by the FASB, extensive disclosures across all metrics are more useful than 
isolated presentation of metrics (FASB 2001). For instance, analysts could better forecast the 
earnings of a firm if they are provided with information on both, rather than just one, of aver-
age revenue per user and customer acquisition cost, because this would enable them to match 
revenues and expenses and gauge the profitability of the company at the subscriber level. 
Similarly, analysts may discount the contribution of high average revenue per user if the 
company also discloses a high churn rate, revealing that future revenue generation may not 
be sustainable at the current levels.” (Simpson 2010, p. 253-254) 
To this list of 31 customer metrics, we added the metric ‘Major Contracts’ with customers, 
whose disclosure is recommended by the Jenkins Committee Report (AICPA 1994). In addition, 
we included two customer metrics whose disclosure is mandated by FASB (i.e., names of cus-
tomers that contribute 10% or more to the revenue of the firm, and customer-related business 
segments). Table 1 outlines the 34 customer metrics and examples of the supporting literature.  
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
The second step was to manually code all annual reports corresponding to the firm-year 
observations identified before. For the coding work, we hired 20 doctoral students enrolled in 
business and economics and trained them in two courses. The first course gave an introduction 
on “Empirical Research on Disclosure & Capital Market Regulation”. The second course was 
particularly designed for this research project and made the students familiar with the customer 
metrics to be coded and provided specific coding instructions.2 In order to ensure the accuracy of 
the coding process, we conducted several coding exercises of annual reports as examples. After 
the courses, the doctoral students had 8 weeks to read the reports they were assigned and to indi-
cate for each of the 34 customer metrics on a checklist whether an annual report disclosed (= 1) 
                                                 
2 The instructions were to (i) consider a piece of information about a metric as “disclosure” only if the firm provided explicit in-
formation on its past/future level, and (ii) code the complete 10-K report including exhibits.  
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or did not disclose (= 0) information related to the customer metrics. For each customer metric, 
the checklist differentiated between backward- and forward-looking disclosures.  
The scoring process yielded a matrix, with binary information about the occurrence of 
backward- and forward-looking disclosures for each of the 34 customer metrics and each of the 
365 and 146 annual reports in the Telecom and Airlines industry respectively. Thus, we derived 
2*34*(365 + 146) = 34,748 pieces of disclosure information about customer metrics. The aver-
age coding time per annual report was about 2 hours.  
For the Telecom sample, we asked two different research assistants to code 30 annual re-
ports. Similarly, for the Airlines sample we asked two different research assistants to code 23 re-
ports. For the Telecom sample we found 89.61% agreement in the coding process, while it was 
87.48% for the Airlines industry. Both values compare very well with the traditional reliability 
checks (for an overview, see Hassan and Marston 2010). Table 2 outlines examples of backward- 
and forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics for both industries.  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
Finally, for each firm-year we calculated the score for backward- and forward-looking 
disclosures of customer metrics by adding up the binary values indicating disclosure (= 1) and 
non-disclosure (= 0) for the 34 metrics. This procedure is consistent with prior work that uses 
hand-coded data to measure disclosures (e.g., Botosan 1997; Clarkson et al. 2008; Jones 2007).  
Analysts’ and Investors’ Uncertainty. Since our objective is to test whether disclosures of 
customer metrics have an impact on analysts’ and investors’ uncertainty about future cash-flows 
of a firm, we measure both metrics after these disclosures occurred. We measure analysts’ uncer-
tainty as the standard deviation of the earnings forecasts made by analysts between the day after 
the release of a firm’s 10-K filing and the day before the release of the next quarterly 10-Q filing, 
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scaled by the stock price at the end of the fiscal year (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Jones 2007). 
Similarly, we measure investors’ uncertainty as the standard deviation of daily stock returns be-
tween the day of the release of a firm’s annual report (10-K filing) and the day before the release 
of the next quarterly report (10-Q). Stock price represents the discounted future cash-flows and 
investors trade firms’ shares because they have different expectations of future cash-flows (Srini-
vasan and Hanssens 2009). As such, greater standard deviation of stock returns reflects greater 
investor uncertainty about a firm’s future cash-flows (Sorescu and Spanjol 2008).  
Firm’s Performance. We measure firms’ financial performance using net operating cash-
flows scaled by total assets (see Gruca and Rego 2005; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998). If 
the disclosures of customer metrics by a firm are likely to be used by competitors, then such dis-
closures should have a negative effect on the future cash-flows of the firm. 
Model  
To test the proposed hypotheses, we need an approach that addresses three critical concerns. 
First, it is important to isolate the effect of disclosures of customer metrics on the dependent var-
iables above and beyond metrics that reflect a firm’s financial health. Therefore, we use multiple 
control variables to account for arguments that better firms are likely to have higher cash flows, 
market capitalization, and liquidity, but lower leverage. It is also important to take into account 
the marketing investments of the firm as it can be argued that firms that make higher disclosures 
of customer metrics are better at marketing. Therefore, we use SG&A spending scaled by total 
assets as an indicator of marketing investments of the firm (see Kim and McAlister 2011; Kurt 
and Hulland 2013). Table 3 outlines all the control variables and their measures.  
We also use hand-coded data to construct a score for the general financial disclosures and 
use it as a control variable (see Web Appendix B). To account for firm-specific fixed effects, 
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each model also includes firm-specific dummies. Furthermore, each model includes the lagged 
value of the dependent variable as a control variable to account for inertia and persistence in the 
dependent variable. These control variables result in the following: 
(1) SDi, t+1 =  β1BDi, t + β2FDi, t + β3SDi, t+ β4GDi, t+ β5ESi, t + β6CFi, t + β7VOLi, t + β8SIZEi, t + β9LEVi, t +  β10LIQi, t +  β11SGi, t + β12NOEi, t + β13NOSi, t+ β14PIOi, t 
+ β15ICt + β16RECt+1 + β17GDPt+1 + β18Tt+1 + α1i + ε1i, t+1 
 
(2) SRi, t+1 =  γ1BDi, t + γ2FDi, t + γ3SRi, t+ γ4GDi, t+ γ5ESi, t + γ6CFi, t + γ7VOLi, t + γ8SIZEi, t + γ9LEVi, t +  γ10LIQi, t +  γ11SGi, t + γ12NOEi, t + γ13NOSi, t+ γ14PIOi, t 
+ γ15ICt + γ16RECt+1 + γ17GDPt+1 + γ18Tt+1 + α2i + ε2i, t+1 
 
(3) CFi, t+1 =  δ1BDi, t + δ2FDi, t + δ3CFi, t+ δ4GDi, t+ δ5VOLi, t + δ6LEVi, t + δ7LIQi, t + δ8SGi, t +  δ9NOSi, t +  δ10PIOi, t + δ11IC t  
+ δ12RECt+1+ δ13GDPt+1+ δ14Tt+1+ α3i + ε3i, t+1 
 
where: 
SDi, t+1 = Analysts’ uncertainty about the financial performance of firm i for the year t+1. 
SRi, t+1 = Investors’ uncertainty about the financial performance of firm i for the year t+1. 
CFi, t+1 = Net operating cash-flows of firm i at the end of year t+1, 
BDi, t = Score of backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics of firm i for year t, 
FDi, t = Score of forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics of firm i for year t, 
GDi, t = General disclosure score of firm i based upon its annual report for year t, 
ESi, t = Earnings Surprise of firm i during the year t, 
VOLi, t = Standard deviation of monthly stock returns of firm i during the year t, 
SIZEi, t = Size of firm i at the end of year t, 
LEVi, t = Financial leverage of firm i at the end of year t, 
LIQi, t = Financial liquidity of firm i at the end of year t, 
SGi, t = SG&A spending of firm i at the end of year t, 
NOEi, t = Number of earnings estimates provided for firm i by financial analysts during year t, 
NOSi, t = Number of operating business segments of firm i at the end of year t, 
PIOi, t = Percentage of stock held by institutional investors of firm i at the end of year t, 
IC t = Industry concentration at the end of year t, 
RECt+1 = A dummy variable that is = 1 before 2008, else = 0.  
GDPt+1 = Growth in the Gross Domestic Product of the United States for the year t+1, 
Tt+1 = Panel Specific Trend of firm i for the year t+1, 
αni = Firm-specific dummy of firm i in equation n to account for firm-specific fixed effects. 
 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
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Second, disclosures of non-financial metrics are usually voluntarily made by firms. Thus, 
backward- (BDi, t) and forward-looking (FDi, t) disclosures of customer metrics and the general 
disclosures (GDi, t) are likely to be endogenous variables (see Ellis, Fee, and Thomas 2012). To 
address this endogeneity, we use two instrumental variables. We first propose that the lagged 
values of disclosures are relevant and valid instruments for current disclosures, i.e., BDi, t-1, FDi, t-
1, and GDi, t-1 are used as instruments for BDi, t, FDi, t, and GDi, t respectively. Lagged values of 
disclosures are likely to be correlated with the current values of disclosures because firms show a 
similar disclosure behavior over time (Simpson 2010). However, disclosures at time (t-1) are not 
likely to have an impact on analysts’ and investors’ uncertainty at time (t+1) because markets are 
efficient (see Fama 1991) so that analysts and investors respond to disclosures immediately in-
stead of waiting for two years (from t-1 to t+1). We also expect that disclosures at time (t-1) do 
not affect cash-flows at time (t+1) because competitors react much quicker to newly available 
information, if they react at all (see Steenkamp et al. 2005).  
Recent research shows that the characteristics of the top management team of a firm have 
an effect on its disclosure policies (see Bamber, Jiang, and Wang 2010). Consistent with this 
finding, we propose that the presence of a Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) is a relevant and valid 
instrument. CMO presence is likely to increase the availability and use of customer metrics 
within the firm (Mintz and Currim 2013). In addition, CMO presence indicates the importance of 
the marketing function for the top management of the firm (Nath and Mahajan 2008, 2011). 
Thus, the availability of customer information combined with the salience of marketing for the 
top management likely results in more disclosures of customer metrics by firms that have a 
CMO.  
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Prior research, however, provides conflicting results regarding the effect of presence of 
a CMO on firm’s future cash-flows (see German, Ebbes, and Grewal 2015; Nath and Mahajan 
2008). Indeed, Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha Jr. (2010) find that on average, the appointment of a 
CMO does not generate significant abnormal returns. Therefore, we expect that the presence of a 
CMO at (t) does not have an effect on analysts’ uncertainty (SDi, t+1), investors’ uncertainty (SRi, 
t+1), and future cash-flows (CFi, t+1). To examine the validity of our assumptions for instrumental 
variables, we outline the first stage results. In addition, we use the Hansen J test to examine 
whether the instruments are valid. The joint null hypothesis in this test is that the instruments are 
not correlated with the error term in the proposed model and that the instruments are correctly 
excluded from the main model (see Hayashi 2000). 
Third, the three dependent variables, i.e., analysts’ uncertainty, investors’ uncertainty, 
and firms’ cash-flows are related to each other. Accordingly, we use a Three Stage Least Squares 
(3SLS) approach to estimate Equations 1-3. This approach allows for errors across the equations 
to be correlated and the endogeneity of the three disclosure-related variables.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 outlines the frequency of backward- and forward-looking disclosures of customer met-
rics. We find that in both industries, firms make significantly more backward- than forward-
looking disclosures of customer metrics.3 In addition, Telecom firms provide more backward- 
                                                 
3 Specifically, Telecommunications: (M = .24, SD = .04 of backward- versus forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics 
M= .08, SD= .02); t(33)= 4.963, p = .000; Airlines: (M= .17, SD= .04 of backward versus forward-looking disclosures of cus-
tomer metrics M= .03, SD= .01); t(33)= 3.794, p = .00. 
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and forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics than Airlines.4 The frequency of disclosures 
also differs across customer metrics. For example, 90% of firms in both industries disclose the 
size of their customer base, but less than 10% of the firms disclose their customer profitability.  
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
Within industries, firms differ in the amount of disclosures of customer metrics (see Fig-
ure 1). For example, Sprint Nextel provides high levels of backward- and forward-looking dis-
closures of customer metrics as compared to Verizon. Similarly, Alaska Air consistently pro-
vides higher levels of backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics as compared to Sky-
west. Interestingly, while Alaska Air increased forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics 
(2007-2011), Skywest stopped making such disclosures in recent years (2010-2011).  
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
As shown in Figure 1, firms tend to be consistent in their disclosures over time. Follow-
ing DeKinder and Kohli (2008), we measure consistency as the average share of actually imple-
mented reversals out of all the possible reversals in disclosures of customer metrics. Reversal of 
disclosure of customer metrics means that a firm goes from disclosure in one year to non-disclo-
sure in the following year or the other way around, i.e., from non-disclosure to disclosure (see 
Web Appendix C for formal description). We find that Telecom (Airlines) firms implemented 
4.06% (2.26%) of all possible reversals of backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics. A 
                                                 
4 Specifically, Backward-looking: (M = 5.84, SD = .22 of Telecommunication disclosures versus Airline disclosures M= 4.92, 
SD= .1); t(145)= -2.816, p = .005; Forward-looking: (M= 1.71, SD= .15 of Telecommunication disclosures versus Airline disclo-
sures M= .57, SD= .08); t(145)= -6.327, p = .00. 
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similar pattern is observed for forward-looking disclosures, as we find 2.43% (1.12%) of all pos-
sible reversals for Telecom (Airlines) firms. Indeed, in examining the standard deviation of the 
disclosures, we find that in both industries, the cross-sectional standard deviation is more than 
twice the within-panel standard deviation.5  
Consequences of Disclosure 
Table 5 outlines the descriptive statistics and Table 6 provides the correlation matrix for the de-
pendent variables, hypothesized variables, and the control variables in both industries. 
[Insert Tables 5 & 6 About Here] 
Diagnostics. Across models, the Hausman test underscores the importance of including 
firm specific fixed-effects.6 As such, the results of hypotheses testing are driven by the “within” 
variation for each firm. We also examine the instrument relevance and validity for each model in 
both industries and find that the lagged value of disclosure has a significant positive impact on 
current disclosure (see Web Appendix D for the 1st stage results). Consistent with our expecta-
tions, the presence of a CMO has a significant positive effect on forward-looking disclosures of 
customer metrics in the Telecom industry (.15, p< .05) and a significant positive effect on back-
ward-looking disclosures in the Airlines industry (.12, p< .00). Importantly, in almost every case 
                                                 
5 Specifically, Telecommunications: (i) backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics (Standard Deviation, cross-sectional = 
6.104; within = 1.983), (ii) forward-looking disclosure of customer metrics (Standard Deviation, cross-sectional = 2.981; within = 
.844). Airlines: (i) backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics (Standard Deviation, cross-sectional = 2.366; within = 
.847), (ii) forward-looking disclosure of customer metrics (Standard Deviation, cross-sectional = 1.253; within = .462). 
6 Specifically, Telecommunications: (i) Analyst Uncertainty: F (37, 139) = 5.76; Prob>F = .000; (ii) Investor Uncertainty: F (37, 
139) = 1.44; Prob>F = .0671; (iii) Future Financial Performance: F (37, 143) = 2.41; Prob>F = .00. Airlines: (i) Analyst Uncer-
tainty: F (14, 65) = 6.12; Prob>F = .000; (ii) Investor Uncertainty: F (14, 65) = .72; Prob>F = .747; (iii) Future Financial Perfor-
mance: F(14, 69) = 2.17; Prob> F = .018. Given that we are simultaneously estimating the models, we include firm fixed-effects 
for each model. 
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we fail to reject the null hypotheses in the Hansen J test (see Table 7). In summary, the proposed 
instruments are both relevant and valid.7 
Backward-Looking Disclosures. We do not find support for H1a as the quantity of back-
ward-looking disclosures of customer metrics is neither associated with analysts’ uncertainty in 
the Telecom (β1 = .021, n.s.) nor the Airlines industry (β1 = .095, n.s.). In addition, we find only 
weak support for H1b, as the quantity of backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics is 
weakly associated with investors’ uncertainty in the Telecom firms (γ1 = -.014, p<.10), but does 
not have a significant effect in the Airlines industry (γ1 = .14, n.s.).  
Forward-Looking Disclosures. Consistent with H2a, quantity of forward-looking disclo-
sures of customer metrics has a significant negative effect on analysts’ uncertainty for Telecom 
firms (β2 = -.125, p<.00). This effect, however, is not significant for firms in the Airlines indus-
try (β2 = -.043, n.s.). Consistent with H2b, we find that quantity of forward-looking disclosures 
of customer metrics has a significant negative impact on investors’ uncertainty in both Telecom 
(γ2 = -.014, p<.05) and Airlines industry (γ2 = -.822, p<.05). 
Future Financial Performance. In contrast to H3a, the effect of the quantity of backward-
looking disclosures on future cash flows is positive in the Telecom industry (δ2 = .052, p<.05). 
This effect, however, is not significant for firms in the Airlines industry (δ2 = -.066, n.s.). We do 
not find support for H3b as quantity of forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics does not 
have a significant effect on future cash flows in the Telecom industry (δ2 = -.015, n.s.). In sharp 
                                                 
7 We also examined whether lagged CMO does have any impact on the dependent variables when all the control variables are 
included in a model. Consistent with our expectations, we find that in 5 out of the 6 cases (3 DVs × 2 Samples) CMO presence 
does not have a significant impact on the dependent variables.  
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contrast to H3b, we find that the quantity of forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics is 
positively associated with future cash-flows in the Airlines industry (δ2 = .105, p<.00). 
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
Sensitivity Analyses 
We conduct multiple sensitivity analyses to mitigate concerns related to alternative expla-
nations and to examine the robustness of current findings. First, we examine whether the theoret-
ical distinction between backward- and forward-looking disclosures as opposed to total disclo-
sure scores, provides empirically distinct findings. As shown in Row 1, Table 8, examining only 
the total disclosure of customer metrics will lead to the erroneous conclusion that any type of dis-
closure of customer metric can lower investors’ and analysts’ uncertainty.  
Second, we examine the use of alternative measures of disclosure metrics. It can be ar-
gued that in order to test the proposed hypotheses, it is important to measure disclosure of cus-
tomer metrics relative to industry averages  to account for industry practices. Accordingly, we 
examine both the difference between the firm’s disclosure score and the industry’s average score, 
and if the firm’s disclosure score is measured as a proportion of industry’s average score. As 
shown in Rows 2 and 3 of Table 8, results remain unchanged if we use these two alternative 
measures. The current coding scheme gives equal weights to both numerical and non-numerical 
disclosures. However, it can be argued that numerical disclosures should have more weightage 
than non-numerical disclosures (see Jones 2007). Therefore, we use a weighted measure of dis-
closures of customer metrics such that numerical disclosures are given a score of 2 while verbal 
disclosures are given a score of 1(see Row 4). Finally, we also examine the robustness of results 
if the customer disclosure scores are scaled by the maximum possible score for customer disclo-
sures (see Row 5) or if they are scaled by the score for the general financial disclosures by the 
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firm (see Row 6). As shown in Rows 4, 5, and 6, we find that our basic conclusions do not 
change if we use these alternative approaches to measure disclosure of customer metrics. 
Third, we examine if our conclusions change when we use alternative dependent varia-
bles. In particular, we find that our conclusions remain unchanged if we use (i) the standard devi-
ation of abnormal stock returns from a Fama-French model (Fama and French 1992), as opposed 
to the raw standard deviation of stock returns (see Row 7), (ii) the median of the error of the ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts (e.g., Thomas 2002), instead of its standard deviation (see Row 8), and 
(iii) reported earnings as the performance metric, rather than cash-flows (see Row 9). As shown 
in Table 8, Rows 7-9, our conclusions remain unchanged. 
Fourth, given concerns related to endogeneity of disclosures, we examine whether our 
conclusions change if we use alternative sets of instruments in the 3SLS estimation. We examine 
(i) the effect of removing CMO as an instrument (see Row 10), (ii) the effect of following Ger-
man, Ebbes, and Grewal (2015) and using industry averages of backward- and forward-looking 
disclosures of customer metrics along with lagged variables as instruments, but removing CMO 
as an instrument (see Row 11), and (iii) a model in which we do not use the lagged variables as 
instruments, so that only CMO presence and the industry averages are used as instruments (see 
Row 12). As shown in Table 8, Rows 10-12, our substantive conclusions are robust to the choice 
of instrumental variables used in the 3SLS estimation.  
Fifth, we assess the use of alternative control variables such as (i) including CEO turno-
ver (Row 13), (ii) including abnormal returns on the day of the release of the annual report (Row 
14), (iii) excluding lagged DVs as control variables (Row 15), (iv) using reported earnings as a 
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control variable for cash-flows (Row 16), and (v) excluding potential outliers, i.e., dropping ob-
servations with residuals beyond 1 and 99 percentile (Row 17). As shown in Table 8, our sub-
stantive conclusions remain unchanged if we use these alternative control variables. 
Sixth, whereas the current study focuses on the quantity of disclosures of customer met-
rics, another dimension of disclosures is their valence, i.e., positive (“good news”) versus nega-
tive (“bad news”). The current focus on quantity of disclosures is consistent with a rich body of 
research that examines the effects of the quantity of disclosures but does not consider the effects 
of valence of such disclosures (e.g., Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Francis, Nanda, 
and Olsson 2008; Leone, Rock, and Willenborg 2007; Shalev 2009). Nevertheless, we follow re-
cent research and adopt an approach for measuring and controlling for the tone of disclosures of 
customer metrics (see Loughran and McDonald 2011).8 Reassuringly, our substantive conclu-
sions remain unchanged if we control for the tone of disclosures (see Row 18).  
In summary, across a broad array of sensitivity tests we continue to find that the quantity 
of forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics lowers (a) analysts’ and investors’ uncer-
tainty in the Telecom sample, and (b) investors’ uncertainty in the Airlines sample. In contrast, 
we barely find any support for the effects of quantity of backward-looking disclosures of cus-
tomer metrics on analysts’ uncertainty. Finally, we do not find a single instance of a negative im-
pact of the quantity of both types of disclosures of customer metrics on future cash-flows.  
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
                                                 
8 Briefly, to classify individual disclosures as either positive or negative we followed prior literature and used the “word list” de-
veloped by Loughran and McDonald (2011) because it is specifically developed for analyzing corporate financial disclosures. We 
considered each disclosure of a customer metric individually and used the word list to classify each disclosure as either positive, 
negative, or neutral. Following Merkeley (2014), we calculate the tone of customer disclosures of each firm and year as: 
Tone = (Sum of Positive Disclosures – Sum of Negative Disclosures)/(Total Disclosures) 
This variable was then included as a control variable in our focal model. 
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DISCUSSION  
Whereas a number of studies call for more disclosure of marketing metrics by publicly listed 
firms, prior literature seldom examines the impact of such disclosures. Indeed, the Marketing Ac-
countability Standards Board (MASB) has recently launched an initiative to explore how report-
ing of marketing metrics can help in making financial reports more informative (see MASB 
2016). Against this background, we present the first empirical investigation of the quantity of 
backward- and forward-looking disclosures of 34 customer metrics by manually coding annual 
reports of firms in two industries. The study has the following implications. 
First, results underscore the importance of considering the backward- and forward-look-
ing disclosures of customer metric separately. In both industries we find that managers are more 
likely to share information about their customer metrics if it pertains to things that have already 
happened (i.e., backward-looking disclosures), as compared to articulating their expectations of 
these metrics (i.e., forward-looking disclosures). Literature in the marketing-finance interface, 
however, seldom differentiates between the backward- and forward-looking disclosures of mar-
keting metrics. Empirical literature in this domain predominantly focusses on examining inves-
tors’ and analysts’ response to backward-looking disclosures such as changes in customer satis-
faction scores (e.g., Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009) and brand dimensions (e.g., Mizik and Jacobson 
2008). Few studies focus on investors’ and analysts’ response to forward-looking disclosures of 
marketing metrics (for an exception see Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007).  
Second, across several robustness tests, we find that forward-looking disclosures of cus-
tomer metrics lower the uncertainty faced by investors in both industries. In addition, we find 
that forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics also lower analysts’ uncertainty for Tele-
com firms. These results, therefore, provide empirical support for recommendations by MASB 
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and MSI that underscore the importance of greater disclosure of marketing metrics (see Gregory 
and Moore 2012; Mizik and Nissim 2011). In addition, the robust effects of forward-looking dis-
closures support the repeated efforts of SEC, FASB, and IASB that encourage firms to disclose 
more forward-looking information.  
Third, the beneficial impact of forward-looking disclosures, combined with the fact that 
we do not find any negative effects of these disclosures on future cash-flows, presents initial em-
pirical evidence for FASB to re-consider its 2004 decision to terminate its project encouraging 
disclosures of customer information by firms. A direct implication is that senior managers such 
as the CEO and the CMO should consider disclosing forward-looking customer information. 
Such forward-looking disclosures could create a richer information environment for analysts and 
investors that, eventually, could lead to a decrease in a firm’s cost of capital (see Lev 2011).  
Our results also speak for an increased role of marketing metrics, and therefore, market-
ing managers in managing investor relations (see Verhoef and Leeflang 2009; Skiera, Bermes, 
and Horn 2011). The findings are relevant for CMOs as they suggest a potential role for them in 
managing the firm’s investor relations. Indeed, we find that the presence of a CMO significantly 
increases forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics for Telecom firms and backward-
looking disclosures of customer metrics by Airlines (see Web Appendix D). Since the CMO 
plays an important role in the use of marketing metrics (see Mintz and Currim 2013), (s)he can 
play a vital role in collecting and communicating customer information to investors. For exam-
ple, a CMO could be involved in the earnings conference calls to disclose and discuss these met-
rics. Such involvement underscores the CMO’s importance and is crucial given the short tenure 
and high vulnerability of the CMO (Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha Jr. 2010). Indeed, we know little 
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about the disclosure of customer information in earnings conference calls or about the involve-
ment of senior marketing managers in them. Future research, therefore, could examine these 
questions.    
Interestingly, we see that a 1% increase in forward-looking disclosures results in a .015 
percent decrease in investors’ uncertainty for Telecom firms, but a much larger decrease for Air-
lines (.822%). One explanation for this difference in the effect size could be that forward-looking 
disclosures of customer metrics are more valuable in industries where the prevalence of contrac-
tual customers is lower, i.e., Airlines. The absence of contractual customers, in turn, makes it 
more difficult for investors and analysts to predict customer behavior, and thus future cash flows. 
As such, additional guidance from managers regarding their expectations about customer metrics 
is more valuable for both investors and analysts.  
We also find that backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics are positively associ-
ated with future cash-flows for Telecom firms, while forward-looking disclosures are positively 
associated with future cash-flows of Airlines. These findings are important because managers 
have strongly opposed increased disclosure requirements arguing that such disclosure require-
ment are likely to be costly and provide sensitive information to competitors. However, it is not 
clear as to why would such disclosures have a positive impact on future financial performance. 
One possible explanation is that such disclosures could be useful in gaining access to credit and 
lower the firm’s cost of capital (see Dhaliwal et al. 2011). Another reason could be that such dis-
closures enhance the board of directors’ monitoring of managerial actions, lower instances of 
managerial opportunism, allow for writing more efficient contracts due to more transparency 
about current and future business conditions, and therefore enhance firm performance (see Arm-
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strong, Guay, and Weber 2010). Also, the increased amount of oversight for investors and ana-
lysts may function as a quality signal and affect credit risk for debt issuers (Tsai, Lu, and Hung 
2016). Clearly, these are preliminary conjectures and more systematic research is required. 
Which type of metrics should firms disclose? 
Results of the current study also raise an important question: for which customer metrics 
should firms make forward-looking disclosures? To analyze this question, for each industry, we 
identified forward-looking disclosures that were disclosed at least once in the sample. These met-
rics were then classified into firm actions and customer outcomes (see Gupta and Zeithaml 
2006). Thus, forward-looking disclosures of firm actions refer to the disclosures related to man-
agers’ expectations of future actions targeted at customers, which includes disclosures such as, 
managers’ expectations of future marketing and advertising spending, customer retention costs 
and service quality initiatives. Forward-looking disclosures of customer outcomes, in turn, refer 
to the disclosures related to managers’ expectations of firm performance with customers. These 
disclosures include information related to managers’ expectations about metrics such as, cus-
tomer satisfaction, customer retention, and customer acquisitions (see Web Appendix E). 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Following the classification of forward-looking disclosures into these two types, we esti-
mate a model that is similar to models 1-3 with one important difference. Instead of one score for 
forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics, we used separate scores for forward-looking 
disclosures of customer metrics related to firm actions and customer outcomes. We then esti-
mated the models following the same procedure and control variables as described for models 1-
3. As shown in Table 9, in both industries we find that the quantity of forward-looking disclo-
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sures of customer outcome metrics has a significant negative effect on both analysts’ and inves-
tors’ uncertainty without any adverse effects on future cash-flows. However, the quantity of for-
ward-looking disclosures of firms’ actions does not have a significant effect on the outcome vari-
ables. A plausible reason for this result is that both analysts and investors are likely to use the 
customer outcome disclosures because they are “closer” to financial outcomes as compared to 
firms’ actions (see Gupta and Zeithaml 2006). Importantly, a direct implication of these results is 
that marketing managers should consider making greater forward-looking disclosures of cus-
tomer outcomes to reduce the uncertainty faced by analysts and investors. In addition, future re-
search could explore other consequences (e.g., cost of capital) and the possible path to making 
disclosures of customer outcome metrics mandatory in the Telecom and Airlines industry. 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As with any empirical exploration of a nascent area, this study has limitations that bring to fore 
opportunities for future research. While the present study is perhaps one of the few that uses 
hand coded data across two industries, it is important to note that disclosure practices and their 
outcomes are industry-specific. As such, future research could generalize our results by examin-
ing disclosures of customer metrics in other industries. Furthermore, as FASB outlined in its pro-
ject updates, intangible assets do not only entail customer metrics on which we focus in this 
study, but also other assets such as R&D and innovation initiatives (FASB 2004). Thus, future 
research could extend this research and analyze how disclosures of other types of intangible as-
sets influence investors’ and analysts’ uncertainty as well as firm’s performance. 
We find that forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics have a significant negative 
effect on investors’ and analysts’ uncertainty. That said, it is possible that there are diminishing 
returns to greater levels of disclosures. We explored this possibility in our current dataset, but did 
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not find support for such effects. One plausible explanation could be that the current levels of 
disclosures of customer metrics are not high enough to allow us to observe such effects. As such, 
future research in other industries could explore this possibility.  
The current study does not explore as to “how” investors and analysts use the information 
provided by disclosures of customer metrics. Interestingly, in the Airlines industry we find that 
the quantity of forward-looking disclosures has a negative effect on investors’ uncertainty but no 
effect on analysts’ uncertainty. This difference is consistent with recent work which finds that 
managerial disclosures such as those contained in the Management Discussion & Analyses sec-
tion of annual reports are more useful for investors than analysts (see Brown and Tucker 2011). 
One plausible reason for this result could be that analysts have greater access to more sophisti-
cated tools for estimating future cash-flows and therefore rely less on firm disclosures of cus-
tomer metrics. However, we know little in terms of analysts’ use of disclosures to update their 
models resulting in a lower dispersion of earnings forecasts. One potential avenue for future re-
search, therefore, would be to conduct in-depth interviews with investors and analysts to under-
stand as to how they use disclosures of non-financial information such as customer metrics.  
This study focuses on disclosures made by firms in their annual reports. While annual re-
ports are the most important source of information for investors (see Botosan and Plumlee 2002), 
firms also make disclosures through other channels such as earnings conference calls, media re-
ports, and the use of social media at different times in a year (e.g., DeFond, Hann, and Hu 2015; 
Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner 1999). As such, future research could examine whether firms pro-
vide disclosures of customer metrics in earnings conference calls or through media reports, and 
whether the timing (e.g., just before or after earnings release; relatively early or late disclosures) 
of these reports is likely to have an impact on analysts’ and investors’ reactions. 
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Consistent with a large body of prior literature (e.g., Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 
2002; Francis, Nanda, and Olsson 2008; Shalev 2009), this study examines the effects of the 
quantity of backward- and forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics. An important ave-
nue for future research, therefore, could be to develop a method to identify disclosures of cus-
tomer metrics that are interpreted as positive or negative news by investors and analysts. How-
ever, developing such a method is not straightforward and recent studies recommend caution in 
using broad-based approaches for doing so (see Muslu et al. 2015). Consider for example the 
statement “We project our revenue per customer to increase to $150 in the next year”. It is not 
clear if this statement reveals positive or negative information. On one hand an “increase” could 
be viewed as a positive signal. On the other hand, if the average increase in the industry is 
higher, then it is a negative signal. Clearly, more research is required in this domain.  
Whereas the current study focusses on the impact of disclosures of customer metrics on 
analysts and investors, there are other potential outcomes that future studies could explore. For 
example, recent studies show that the financial disclosures can have an impact on consumer per-
ceptions of firms and their brands (see Tian and Zhou 2015). Also, it can be argued that higher 
disclosure of customer metrics could function as a signal of transparency and therefore increase 
confidence in the firms’ potential conduct with key accounts and/or alliance partners.   
The current study finds that prior disclosure of customer metrics and the presence of a 
CMO have significant effects on current disclosures of customer metrics. Future research, there-
fore, can build on our initial findings to systematically identify factors that drive disclosures of 
customer metrics. Addressing this and similar questions could provide valuable insights into the 
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CUSTOMER METRICS DISCUSSED IN MARKETING LITERATURE AND ACCOUNTING REGULATIONS 
 
Metrics Examples of Supporting Literature Metrics Examples of Supporting Literature 
Marketing Spending Kim and McAlister (2011); Luo (2008) Customer Satisfaction Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl (2004); Fornell et al. 
(2006) 
Advertising Spending McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim (2007); Srinivasan et al. 
(2009) 
Perceived Quality Aaker and Jacobson (1994); Rego, Billett, and Morgan 
(2009) 
Customer Acquisition Costs Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart (2004); Schulze, Skiera, and 
Wiesel (2012) 
Customer Loyalty Chen and Xie (2007); Vogel, Evanschitzky, and Ramaseshan 
(2008) 
Customer Retention Costs Gupta and Zeithaml (2006); Reinartz, Thomas, and 
Kumar (2005) 
Purchase Intention Srinivasan, Vanhuele, and Pauwels (2010); Tellis (1988) 
Customer Base Size Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart (2004); Schulze, Skiera, and 
Wiesel (2012) 
Brand Equity  Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin (2003); Rego, Billett, and 
Morgan (2009) 
Customers Acquired Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart (2004); Schulze, Skiera, and 
Wiesel (2012) 
Commitment Gupta and Zeithaml (2006); Palmatier (2008) 
Customers Lost Thomas, Blattberg, and Fox (2004); Wiesel, Skiera, and 
Villanueva (2008) 
Perceived Value Rust, Lemon, and Zeithaml (2004); Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and 
Sabol (2002) 
Customer Retention Rate Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart (2004); Schulze, Skiera, and 
Wiesel (2012) 
Trust  Gupta and Zeithaml (2006); Palmatier (2008) 
Customer Profitability Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart (2004); Schulze, Skiera, and 
Wiesel (2012) 
Awareness Keller and Lehmann (2006); Srinivasan, Vanhuele, and 
Pauwels (2010) 
Average Revenue per Customer Iyengar, Ansari, and Gupta (2007); Wiesel, Skiera, and 
Villanueva (2008) 
Interest Keller and Lehmann (2006); Mizik and Jacobson (2008) 
Word of Mouth / Referrals Luo (2009); Villanueva, Yoo, and Hanssens (2008) Knowledge Mizik and Jacobson (2008); Rust et al. (2004) 
Cross Selling Rate  Schmitz, Lee, and Lilien (2014) Desire Keller and Lehmann (2006) 
Customer Lifetime Value (CLV) Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart (2004); Schulze, Skiera, and 
Wiesel (2012) 
Liking Srinivasan, Vanhuele, and Pauwels (2010) 
Customer Equity Kumar and Shah (2009); Vogel, Evanschitzky, and 
Ramaseshan (2008); Srinivasan and Hanssens (2009) 
Associations Krasnikov, Mishra, and Orozco (2009) 
Customer Engagement Value  Kumar et al. (2010) Attitude Lane and Jacobson (1995); Park et al. (2010) 
Customer Segments FASB (1997) Attachment Park et al. (2010) 
Major Customers FASB (1997)   






EXAMPLES OF BACKWARD- AND FORWARD-LOOKING DISCLOSURES OF CUSTOMER METRICS 
 
Customer Metric Backward-Looking Disclosures Forward-Looking Disclosures 
Customer Retention Rate 
(Telecommunications) 
Alamosa Holdings Inc (2002) 
Monthly churn for 2002 was approximately 3.4 percent compared to approxi-
mately 2.7 percent for 2001. 
Alamosa Holdings Inc (2003) 
The rate of churn experienced in 2002 was the highest that we have experienced on 
an annual basis since the inception of the Company. We expect that in the near term 
churn may increase as a result of the implementation of the FCC's WLNP mandate 
in all of our markets during 2004.  
Customer Segments 
(Telecommunications) 
Intermedia Communications Inc (1999) 
The major accounts unit focuses on Fortune 2000 companies. The mid-mar-
ket/Web centric unit addresses the large and growing number of mid-size busi-
nesses requiring mission-critical hosting services. The alternate channel sales 
group works closely with Digex's extensive network of business alliance part-
ners. 
Pacific Gateway Exchange Inc (1998) 
The Company expects that its bandwidth and internet operations will become its 
fourth business segment. 
Customer Acquisition Costs 
(Telecommunications) 
Metro PCS (2009) 
Cost Per Gross Addition (CPGA) increased to $145.79 for the year ended De-
cember 31, 2009 from $127.21 for the year ended December 31, 2008. 
Ubiquitel Inc. (2003)  
Cost Per Gross Addition (CPGA) was approximately $450 for the year ended De-
cember 31, 2003 which is comparable to approximately $444 for the year ended 
December 31, 2002. We believe that CPGA will remain at approximately current 
levels in the near-term due to significant competition coupled with our commit-
ment to quality subscriber additions. 
Customer Base Size 
(Airlines) 
Delta Air Lines Inc (2001) 
This year, over 104 million passengers chose to fly Delta (including its wholly 
owned subsidiaries Atlantic Southeast Airlines, Inc. and Comair, Inc.) - more 
than any other airline. 
Alaska Air Group Inc (2011) 
If these efforts* are unsuccessful or they negatively affect our reputation with our 
existing customer base, we may experience an adverse impact on our business and 
financial results. 
*(i) online purchasing portal (alaskaair.com), (ii) social media, and (iii) customer loyalty programs. 
Perceived Quality 
(Airlines) 
Airtran Holdings Inc (2009) 
In January 2010, AirTran Airways was awarded the prestigious 2009 Market 
Leadership Award from leading industry publication, Air Transport World, for 
AirTran’s innovative combination of low-cost, high-quality service and re-
sponse to the global financial crisis. 
Continental Airlines Inc (1995) 
Management has targeted improved customer service (as evidenced by standard 
measures such as on-time performance, mishandled bags and customer com-
plaints) as a major priority. […] Continental's goal for 1996 is to be ranked 
monthly in the top three in each of these DOT (Department of Transportation; 
added by authors) performance metrics. 
Customer Segments 
(Airlines) 
Continental Airlines Inc (2004) 
We have two reportable segments: mainline and regional. The mainline seg-
ment consists of flights to cities with jets with a capacity of greater than 100 
seats while the regional segment consists of flights with jets with a capacity of 
50 or fewer seats. 
Jetblue Airways Corp (2003) 
In 2004, we plan to launch Company Blue, a corporate travel booking program, 
which should allow us to penetrate the managed business travel segment by offer-
ing corporate managers the ability to better track, record and report on their com-
pany's travel expenses. 
42 
Notes: Emphasis added in the text. 
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Table 3 
MEASURES, SOURCES, AND SUPPORTING LITERATURE OF VARIABLES USED IN THE MODEL 
 
Variable Measure SOURCE Supporting Literature 
Analysts’ Uncertaintyi, t Standard deviation of earnings forecast made by analysts following the re-
lease of firm’s annual report (10-K) and before the release of the quarterly re-
port (10-Q), scaled by the stock price at the end of fiscal year (PRCC_F) 
I/B/E/S & CRSP Jones (2007) 
Investors’ Uncertaintyi, t  Standard deviation of daily stock returns following the release of firm’s an-
nual report (10-K) and before the release of the quarterly report (10-Q)  
CRSP Sorescu and Spanjol (2008) 
Cash-flowsi, t Net operating cash-flows (OANCF), scaled by total assets (AT) COMPUSTAT Gruca and Rego (2005);  
General Disclosure Scorei, t General disclosure score calculated using prior literature in accounting (see 
the Web Appendix B) 
10-K Reports Jones (2007) 
Earnings Surprisei,t Difference between the mean earnings estimate by analysts and the actual 
earnings reported by the firm. 
I/B/E/S & 
COMPUSTAT 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
Volatilityi, t Standard deviation of monthly stock returns during the fiscal year of the firm CRSP Sorescu and Spanjol (2008) 
Firm Sizei, t Market value of equity (PRCC_F×CSHO) COMPUSTAT Prabhu, Chandy, and Ellis (2005) 
Leveragei, t Ratio of total long-term debt (DLTT) and market value of equity 
(PRCC_F×CSHO) 
COMPUSTAT Bhojraj, Blacconiere, and 
D'Souza (2004) 
Liquidityi, t Ratio of current assets (ACT) and current liabilities (LCT) COMPUSTAT Tuli and Bharadwaj (2009) 
Advertising Spendingi, t Total reported advertising expenses (XAD) scaled by total sales (REVT) COMPUSTAT Current Study 
Number of Estimatesi, t Number of earnings forecast made by analysts following the release of firm’s 
annual report (10-K) and before the release of the quarterly report (10-Q), 
I/B/E/S Current Study 
Number of Operating Segmentsi, t Number of operating business segments identified by the firm  10-K Reports Jones (2007) 
Institutional Holdingi, t Percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors COMPUSTAT Bhojraj, Blacconiere, and 
D'Souza (2004) 
Industry Concentrationt Sum of squares of market-shares of all firms present in an industry in year t COMPUSTAT Gasper and Massa (2006) 
RECt A dummy variable that is = 0 if year is before 2008, else = 1 Manual Coding Current Study 
GDPt Growth in the Gross Domestic Product of the US Economy BEA Website Current Study 
Trendit Panel specific time trend Manual Coding Current Study 
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Table 4 
FREQUENCY OF BACKWARD-LOOKING & FORWARD-LOOKING DISCLOSURES OF 














Customer Base Size 87.12% 45.21% 68.85% 3.83% 
Customer Acquisition Costs 64.93% 17.81% 12.57% .00% 
Customer Segments 61.10% 9.59% 20.77% .55% 
Perceived Quality 56.44% 21.37% 26.78% 5.46% 
Major Customers 55.62% 59.45% 26.23% .55% 
Advertising Spending 52.60% 4.93% 60.66% .00% 
Customers Acquired 48.49% 21.10% 6.01% 2.73% 
Customer Satisfaction 44.93% 17.26% 20.77% 14.21% 
Average Revenue per Customer  42.19% 16.16% 35.52% .00% 
Marketing Spending 42.19% 13.97% 29.51% .55% 
Customer Retention Rate 41.37% 31.51% .00% 1.09% 
Customer Retention Costs 37.26% 12.60% 12.57% 1.09% 
Major Contracts 34.79% 15.89% 43.72% 9.29% 
Customers Lost 25.75% 13.97% 1.09% .00% 
Brand Equity 19.45% 3.56% 7.65% .55% 
Awareness 19.18% 10.96% 1.64% .00% 
Customer Equity 16.99% 9.59% 2.19% .00% 
Customer Loyalty 15.89% 14.79% 27.32% 6.56% 
Cross Selling Rate 13.70% 11.23% 18.58% .00% 
Knowledge 8.49% .82% .00% .00% 
Customer Profitability 5.75% 1.10% 9.84% .00% 
Commitment 5.75% .27% 1.09% .00% 
Perceived Value 4.66% 1.92% 2.73% .00% 
Interest 3.56% .00% .55% .00% 
Associations 3.29% .00% .00% .00% 
Attachment 2.47% .82% .00% .00% 
Desire 2.19% .00% .00% .00% 
Word of Mouth / Referrals 1.37% 1.37% .00% .00% 
Trust 1.37% .00% .00% .00% 
Purchase Intention 1.10% .00% .00% .00% 
Customer Lifetime Value (CLV) .82% .00% .00% .00% 
Customer Engagement Value .00% .00% .00% .00% 
Liking .00% .00% 2.73% .00% 
Attitude .00% .00% .00% .00% 
Notes: To be read as X percentage of the firm-year observations exhibit disclosure about this metric. For example, we see backward-looking dis-





  Telecommunications (n = 192) Airlines (n = 95) 
  Variables Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
1 Analysts‘ Uncertaintyi, t .06 .25 .00 3.03 .05 .18 .00 1.66 
2 Investors‘ Uncertaintyi, t .03 .02 .00 .10 .03 .02 .01 .14 
3 Cash-flowsi, t  .11 .08 -.21 .30 .09 .08 -.14 .26 
4 BDi, t 12.04 5.94 2.00 26.00 5.64 2.34 1.00 11.00 
5 FDi, t 2.89 2.59 .00 12.00 .61 1.02 .00 5.00 
6 General Disclosurei, t 59.25 15.68 17.00 89.00 64.93 9.44 48.00 85.00 
7 Volatilityi, t .13 .09 .02 .59 .15 .08 .05 .51 
8 Sizei, t 22237.14 46385.43 10.13 251169.70 2370.65 3428.07 30.05 16904.55 
9 Earnings Surprisei,t .01 .25 -1.92 1.93 .05 .53 -.69 5.10 
10 Leveragei, t .44 .26 .00 1.15 .31 .16 .01 .64 
11 Liquidityi, t 1.44 1.02 .06 5.71 1.27 .75 .44 4.41 
12 Marketing Spendingi, t .11 .14 .00 1.55 .08 .07 .00 .34 
13 Number of Estimatesi, t 13.14 9.66 2.00 41.00 9.61 3.98 3.00 23.00 
14 Number of Segmentsi, t 3.33 2.01 1.00 11.00 2.12 1.49 1.00 7.00 
15 Institutional Holdingi, t  47.24 35.42 .00 100.00 .84 .14 .43 1.00 
16 Industry Concentrationt .311 .046 .241 .424 .20 .12 .11 .55 
17 RECt .69 .46 .00 1.00 .60 .49 .00 1.00 
18 GDPt 2.15 1.88 -2.80 4.80 2.15 1.88 -2.80 4.80 
Notes: BDi, t = Quantity of Backward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics; FDi, t = Quantity of Forward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics. REC = recession dummy variable; 




Telecom (n = 192) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  
1 Analysts‘ Uncertaintyi, t 1.00                  
2 Investors‘ Uncertaintyi, t .28 1.00                 
3 Cash-flowsi, t  -.32 -.47 1.00                
4 BDi, t -.11 .03 -.01 1.00               
5 FDi, t -.05 .12 -.25 .59 1.00              
6 General Disclosurei, t -.02 .25 -.03 .60 .46 1.00             
7 Volatilityi, t .35 .77 -.47 .03 .14 .25 1.00            
8 Sizei, t -.09 -.28 .16 -.34 -.22 -.67 -.28 1.00           
9 Earnings Surprisei,t .22 -.04 -.14 -.06 -.01 -.04 .01 -.02 1.00          
10 Leveragei, t .18 .13 -.17 .36 .18 .34 .10 -.37 .15 1.00         
11 Liquidityi, t .00 .20 -.02 .01 -.03 .24 .24 -.31 .03 -.11 1.00        
12 Marketing Spendingi, t .12 .34 -.18 .01 -.09 .03 .26 -.09 -.10 .03 .10 1.00       
13 Number of Estimatesi, t -.06 -.29 .14 -.06 -.04 -.44 -.28 .69 .01 -.27 -.33 -.09 1.00      
14 Number of Segmentsi, t .00 .00 .17 -.33 -.34 -.19 -.11 .18 .00 -.04 -.06 -.21 -.07 1.00     
15 Institutional Holdingi, t  -.23 -.18 .35 .34 .11 .18 -.18 -.07 -.11 .13 .16 -.03 .13 -.26 1.00    
16 Industry Concentrationt -.03 .19 -.10 .09 .18 .13 .20 .02 -.05 -.14 -.08 -.08 .06 -.03 -.30 1.00   
17 RECt .05 .10 -.11 -.22 .03 .03 .13 .02 -.01 -.21 -.02 -.03 -.10 .04 -.27 .15 1.00  
18 GDPt -.02 .06 -.03 -.01 .13 .10 -.02 .01 -.10 -.18 .04 -.07 .05 .01 -.18 .33 .36 1.00 
Airlines (n = 95) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  
1 Analysts‘ Uncertaintyi, t 1.00                  
2 Investors‘ Uncertaintyi, t .44 1.00                 
3 Cash-flowsi, t  -.42 -.43 1.00                
4 BDi, t .01 .19 -.10 1.00               
5 FDi, t -.04 .00 .12 .50 1.00              
6 General Disclosurei, t .18 .12 .07 .63 .28 1.00             
7 Volatilityi, t .28 .72 -.51 .31 .05 .16 1.00            
8 Sizei, t -.13 -.16 .18 -.51 -.17 -.62 -.29 1.00           
9 Earnings Surprisei,t .87 .40 -.29 -.03 -.06 .08 .20 -.06 1.00          
10 Leveragei, t -.11 .15 -.46 .02 .06 -.14 .26 -.26 -.09 1.00         
11 Liquidityi, t .02 -.05 .17 -.15 .13 .17 -.13 -.21 .06 .01 1.00        
12 Advertisingi, t .54 .27 -.36 .31 .08 .31 .32 -.23 .32 -.07 .04 1.00       
13 Number of Estimatesi, t -.26 -.19 .11 -.40 -.11 -.69 -.27 .55 -.15 -.02 -.24 -.32 1.00      
14 Number of Segmentsi, t .24 .06 -.20 .16 -.08 .25 .03 -.34 .15 -.06 -.13 .04 -.33 1.00     
15 Institutional Holdingi, t  -.13 -.11 -.06 .10 .33 -.12 -.16 -.06 -.14 .49 .00 -.15 .10 -.11 1.00    
16 Industry Concentrationt -.15 -.19 .47 -.26 -.22 -.10 -.18 .09 -.06 -.40 -.13 -.40 .28 -.08 -.40 1.00   
17 RECt -.15 -.34 .30 -.29 -.35 -.07 -.27 .04 -.14 -.26 .01 -.19 .09 .05 -.32 .40 1.00  
18 GDPt -.30 -.13 .58 -.07 -.12 -.03 -.32 .09 -.23 -.34 -.03 -.30 .17 -.06 -.22 .58 .37 1.00 
Notes: BDi, t = Quantity of Backward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics; FDi, t = Quantity of Forward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics. REC = recession dummy variable; GDP = US 
Gross Domestic Product Growth; For the Telecom , all correlations greater than |.14| are significant at p<.05. For the Airlines, all correlations greater than |.20| are significant at p < .05. 
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Table 7 
CONSEQUENCES OF DISCLOSURES OF CUSTOMER METRICS 
 
  Telecom  (n = 192) Airlines (n = 95) 
  Analysts’  Uncertaintyi, t+1 
Investors’  




Uncertaintyi, t+1 Cash-Flowsi, t+1 
  Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   
Hypothesized Variables                    
BDi, t .021 .034  -.014 .009 * .052 .025 ** .095 .065  .140 .686  -.066 .089  
FDi, t -.125 .029 *** -.014 .007 ** -.015 .020  -.043 .046  -.822 .449 ** .105 .040 *** 
Control Variables                    
DVi, t  .192 .071 *** -.128 .089  .296 .074 *** .580 .112 *** -.169 .113  .112 .153  
General Disclosurei, t .096 .062  .018 .017  .053 .044  -.153 .445  .219 4.834  -.300 .625  
Earnings Surprisei, t -.027 .020  -.012 .005 **    -.099 .022 *** .231 .224     
Cash-flowsi, t -.487 .099 *** -.010 .026     -.396 .098 *** -2.831 1.051 ***    
Volatilityi, t .286 .088 *** .067 .027 ** .051 .064  .009 .010  .287 .115 ** -.018 .015  
Sizei, t -.052 .008 *** .004 .002 *    -.012 .016  .117 .152     
Leveragei, t -.136 .077 * .034 .020 * -.071 .056  -.280 .159 * .303 1.640  -.018 .186  
Liquidityi, t -.057 .019 *** -.007 .005  .026 .013 * -.019 .024  -.412 .277  -.042 .037  
MarketingSpendingi, t .049 .112  -.010 .030  .070 .080  .098 .111  2.979 1.239 ** -.281 .171 * 
Number of Estimatesi, t .021 .010 ** .003 .002     -.069 .018 *** -.321 .186 *    
Number of Segmentsi, t .009 .010  .005 .003 * .012 .007  -.021 .017  -.257 .186  -.049 .022 ** 
Institutional Holdingi, t .008 .006  .000 .002  .005 .004  .017 .066  -.073 .698  -.046 .082  
Industry Concentrationt -.324 .226  -.096 .059  -.079 .162  .094 .097  -1.706 1.039  .059 .141  
RECt .003 .022  -.027 .006 *** .003 .016  -.017 .015  -1.051 .155 *** .043 .020 ** 
GDPt .001 .003  .000 .001  -.002 .002  -.010 .003 *** .012 .028  .017 .004 *** 
Trendit .001 .003  -.004 .001 *** .000 .002  -.005 .003  -.149 .031 *** .007 .004  
Constant .343 .177 * -.010 .047  -.164 .123  .930 1.991  -1.252 21.776  1.396 2.747  
Chi-Square (df) (55) = 1000.110 *** (55) = 339.52 *** (51) = 738.17 *** (32) = 736.89 *** (32) = 198.34 *** (28) = 206.67 *** 
Hansen Test (df) (1) = 2.834 * (1) = 2.132  (1) = .848  (1) = .626  (1) = 1.154  (1) = .166  
Notes: Each model contains firm-specific fixed effects. Coeff = Coefficient; SE = Standard Error; BDi, t = Quantity of Backward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics; FDi, t = Quantity of Forward-
Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics; DV = Dependent Variable; REC = recession dummy variable; GDP = US Gross Domestic Product Growth; df = Degrees of Freedom. * = p < .10; ** = p < 
.05; *** = p < .01 (1-tailed for hypothesized variables, else 2-tailed). Consistent with Muslu et al. (2015), all variables were log-transformed. 
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Table 8:  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
  Telecom Airlines 
 AUi,(t+1) IUi,(t+1) CFi,(t+1) AUi,(t+1) IUi,(t+1) CFi,(t+1) 
Aggregated Measure of Disclosure             
(1) Total Disclosure of Customer Metricsi,t  -.059 ** -.021 ** .025  -.011  -.160  .123 * 
Alternative Measures of Disclosures             
(2) Measured Relative to Industry Average              
BDi,t .050  -.009  .051 ** .061  .573  -.037  
FDi,t -.111 *** -.012 ** -.010  -.006  -.747 * .080 * 
(3) Measured as a Proportion of Industry Average              
BDi,t .112  -.022  .129 ** -.199  1.322  .070  
FDi,t -.160 *** -.015 * -.020  .013  -.231 *** .009  
(4) Weighted Measure              
BDi,t -.001  -.014 ** .039 ** .108  -.368  -.058  
FDi,t -.109 *** -.011 ** -.016  -.059 * -.546 * .099 *** 
(5) Scaling By Total Possible Score              
BDi,t .067  -.029 * .115 ** .174  .879  -.205  
FDi,t -.067 *** -.008 ** -.006  -.005  -.319 ** .033 *** 
(6) Scaling By General Disclosure              
BDi,t .093  -.095 ** .324 ** .797  3.680  -.335  
FDi,t -1.609 *** -.163 * -.468  -2.342  -37.686 ** 3.706 *** 
Alternative Dependent Variables             
(7) Alternative Measure of Investors' Uncertainty             
 BDi,t .037  -.004  .043 ** .096  -.036  -.108  
FDi,t -.122 *** -.018 ** -.011  -.047  -.049 * .087 ** 
(8) Alternative Measure of Analysts' Uncertainty             
BDi,t -.227  -.012  .037 * .214  -.193  -.030  
FDi,t -.655 *** -.014 ** -.008  -.385  -.492 * .097 *** 
(9) Using ROA to Measure Financial Performance             
BDi,t .019  -.015 * .035 * .055  -.053  .042  
FDi,t -.124 *** -.014 ** .008  -.021  -.649 * .087 ** 
AUi,(t+1) = Analysts’ Uncertainty for firm i at time t+1; IUi,(t+1) = Investors’ Uncertainty for firm i at time t+1; CFi,(t+1) = Cash-flows of firm i at 
time t+1; BDi, t = Quantity of Backward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics; FDi, t = Quantity of Forward-Looking Disclosures of Cus-




Table 8 (Cntd):  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 Telecom Airlines 
 AUi,(t+1) IUi,(t+1) CFi,(t+1) AUi,(t+1) IUi,(t+1) CFi,(t+1) 
Using Alternative Instruments             
(10) Removing CMO as an Instrument             
BDi,t .027  -.014 * .050 ** -2.121  2.910  -.183  
FDi,t -.101 *** -.013 ** -.021  .979  -1.910 ** .128 *** 
(11) Replacing CMO by Industry Averages             
BDi,t .027  -.009  .047 ** -2.890 * 1.432  -.144  
FDi,t -.087 *** -.015 ** -.027  1.306  -1.615 ** .129 *** 
(12) Using ONLY CMO & Industry Averages             
BDi,t -.057  .084  -.054  .011  -1.084  .092  
FDi,t -.155 *** -.049 ** -.007  -.148 ** -2.799 ** .140 *** 
Using Additional Controls             
(13) Including CEO Turnover              
BDi,t .020  -.014 * .053 ** .079  .159  -.070  
FDi,t -.124 *** -.014 ** -.015  -.040  -.811 ** .100 *** 
(14) Including 10-K Abnormal Returns              
BDi,t .023  -.009  .040 * .067  -.106  -.074  
FDi,t -.134 *** -.021 *** -.005  -.026  -.533 * .082 ** 
(15) Excluding the Lagged DVs              
BDi,t .034  -.010  .059 ** .002  -.122  -.039  
FDi,t -.108 *** -.011 * .006  .027  -.742 * .095 *** 
(16) Using ROA as an Additional Control 
Variable for Cash-flows Model  
            
BDi,t .021  -.014 * .051 ** .055  -.018  -.031  
FDi,t -.125 *** -.015 ** -.011  -.033  -.786 ** .092 *** 
(17) Removing Outliers             
BDi,t -.009  -.019 ** .053 ** .066  .041  -.052  
FDi,t -.146 *** -.024 *** -.013  -.034  -.687 * .110 *** 
(18) Controlling for Tone of Disclosure of 
Customer Metrics  
           
BDi,t .020  -.014 * .050 ** .079  -.131  .009  
FDi,t -.118 *** -.011 * -.008  -.020  -.794 ** .105 *** 
AUi,(t+1) = Analysts’ Uncertainty for firm i at time t+1; IUi,(t+1) = Investors’ Uncertainty for firm i at time t+1; CFi,(t+1) = Cash-flows of firm i at 
time t+1; BDi, t = Quantity of Backward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics; FDi, t = Quantity of Forward-Looking Disclosures of Cus-
tomer Metrics; * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 (1-tailed). 
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Table 9 
SPLITTING FORWARD-LOOKING DISCLOSURES OF CUSTOMER METRICS INTO FIRM ACTIONS & CUSTOMER OUTCOMES 
  Telecom (n = 192) Airlines (n = 95) 
  Analysts’  Uncertaintyi, t+1 
Investors’  




Uncertaintyi, t+1 Cash-flowsi, t+1 
  Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   Coeff S.E.   
Forward-Looking Disclosures                                   
Firm-Actionsi, t -.147 .130  .005 .027  .025 .063  .004 .067  .266 .713  .043 .084  
Customer-Outcomesi, t -.083 .035 *** -.015 .007 ** -.010 .019  -.132 .100 * -2.365 .848 *** .129 .060 ** 
Control Variables                                     
BDi, t .022 .043  -.015 .010  .043 .026 * .086 .073  -.958 .810  -.007 .087  
DVi, t  .149 .096  -.102 .093  .308 .078 *** .625 .156 *** -.036 .131  .156 .130  
General Disclosurei, t .101 .084  .025 .018  .063 .048  .068 .362  -1.974 3.518  -.129 .413  
EarningsSurprisei, t -.025 .024  -.013 .005 ***      -.085 .028 *** .648 .313 **      
Cash-flowsi, t -.512 .127 *** -.010 .028       -.397 .107 *** -3.496 1.085 ***      
Volatilityi, t .318 .120 *** .058 .030 * .039 .068  .009 .011  .257 .133 * -.017 .015  
Sizei, t -.047 .011 *** .003 .002       .007 .021  .358 .180 **      
Leveragei, t -.133 .102  .041 .023 * -.051 .062  -.154 .138  .472 1.387  .063 .150  
Liquidityi, t -.068 .025 *** -.007 .006  .025 .014 * -.041 .037  -.894 .396 ** -.030 .044  
MarketingSpendingi, t .118 .209  -.029 .045  .028 .104  .202 .163  5.361 1.792 *** -.359 .202 * 
Number of Estimatesi, t .025 .013 ** .002 .003       -.066 .019 *** -.416 .207 **       
Number of Segmentsi, t .003 .017  .007 .004 * .014 .009  -.006 .015  -.189 .164  -.050 .020 ** 
Institutional Holdingi, t .001 .009  .001 .002  .006 .005  .005 .071  .386 .773  -.083 .087  
Industry Concentrationt -.434 .329  -.086 .073  -.025 .187  .162 .108  -.907 1.191  .057 .148  
RECt .009 .028  -.028 .006 *** .003 .016  -.026 .019  -1.165 .185 *** .044 .021 ** 
GDPt .001 .004  .000 .001  -.002 .002  -.011 .003 *** -.002 .032  .017 .004 *** 
Trendit .002 .004  -.003 .001 *** .000 .003  -.007 .003 ** -.157 .033 *** .007 .004  
Constant .314 .229  -.029 .050  -.200 .139  -.129 1.556  8.827 15.660  .575 1.794  
Chi-Square (df) (56) = 669.45 *** (56) = 325.14 *** (52) = 702.48 *** (33) = 552.81 *** (33) = 148.86 *** (29) = 194.34 *** 
Hansen Test (df) (1) = 1.706  (1) = 1.171  (1) = .024  (1) = 1.176  (1) = .361  (1) = .200  
Notes: Each model contains firm-specific fixed effects. Coeff = Coefficient; SE = Standard Error; BDi, t = Quantity of Backward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics; DV = Dependent Variable; 
REC = recession dummy variable; GDP = US Gross Domestic Product Growth; df = Degrees of Freedom. * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 (1-tailed for hypothesized variables, else 2-tailed). 
Consistent with Muslu et al. (2015), all variables were log-transformed. 
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Figure 1 
EXAMPLES OF DISCLOSURE BEHAVIOR OF FIRMS OVER TIME 
Scores of Backward-Looking  
Disclosures of Customer Metrics  
Scores of Forward-Looking  
Disclosures of Customer Metrics 
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WEB APPENDIX A  
FIRMS USED IN THE STUDY+ 
Telecommunications   Airlines   
Firm n Firm n Firm n 
Alamosa Holdings, Inc. 5 Leap Wireless International, Inc.* 8 AirTran Holdings, Inc. 10 
Alaska Communications Systems Group, Inc. 13 Level 3 Communications, Inc. 14 Alaska Air Group Inc. 17 
Asia Global Crossing Ltd.* 1 MCI, Inc.*  1 Allegiant Travel Co. 5 
A&T, Inc.  18 McLeodUSA, Inc. 6 Atlantic Southeast Airlines 4 
Bellsouth Corp.  12 MetroPCS Communications, Inc. 5 Continental Airlines, Inc. 13 
Boston Communications Group, Inc.  10 Network Plus Corp.*  2 Delta Air Lines, Inc. 9 
CenturyLink, Inc. 18 NII Holdings, Inc. 9 ExpressJet Holdings 7 
Cincinnati Bell, Inc. 9 North Pittsburgh Systems, Inc.* 4 Great Lakes Aviation, Ltd.* 2 
Cogent Communications Group, Inc. 6 NTELOS Holdings Corp. 6 Hawaiian Holdings, Inc. 7 
Commonwealth Telephone Enterprises, Inc. 10 OmniSky Corp.*  1 JetBlue Airways Corp. 9 
Consolidated Communications Holding, Inc. 7 Pacific Gateway Exchange, Inc. 4 Midwest Air Group, Inc 11 
Covad Communications Group, Inc. 3 Paging Network, Inc. 4 Northwest Airlines Corp.* 1 
CT Communications, Inc.  8 Rural Cellular Corp. 12 Reno Air, Inc* 2 
Cypress Communications, Inc.* 1 Shared Technologies Cellular, Inc.* 2 Republic Airways Inc. 8 
Dobson Communications Corp. 8 Shenandoah Telecom Corp. 10 SkyWest, Inc. 11 
Elephant Talk Communications, Inc.* 1 Sprint Nextel Corp.  7 Southwest Airlines Co. 15 
Embarq Corp. 3 Star Telecommunications, Inc. 3 United Inc. 9 
FairPoint Communications, Inc. 8 Talk America Holdings, Inc. 10 US Airways Group Inc. 6 
FiberNet Telecom Group, Inc.* 8 Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. 18   
Firstcom Corp.* 1 TW Telecom, Inc.  4   
Frontier Communications Corp. 4 UbiquiTel, Inc. 5   
Global Crossing Ltd.* 7 US LEC Corp.  8   
Hawaiian Telcom Holdco, Inc.* 1 US Unwired, Inc.  5   
HickoryTech Corp.  14 USA Mobility, Inc.* 4   
Illuminet Holdings, Inc.* 2 USCI, Inc.*  3   
Intermedia Communications, Inc. 5 Verizon Communications, Inc. 12   
Iowa Telecommunications Services, Inc. 6 Virgin Mobile USA, Inc.* 2   
ITXC Corp.  5 World Access, Inc.* 2   
Total     365 Total 146 
+This table outlines all firms for which annual reports were available at www.sec.gov. As such, we were able to measure backward- and for-
ward-looking disclosures of customer metrics for each of these firms. However, to estimate the 3SLS model for testing the hypotheses we 
required (a) at least 3 years of firm-year data, and (b) the firms to be covered at least for 3 years in COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and IBES. As a 
result, firms marked with * were not used in the empirical model because they could not fulfill the requirements of either (a) or (b).  
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WEB APPENDIX B 
CONTROLLING FOR GENERAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 
To control for the overall openness of a firm’s disclosure policy, we coded general disclo-
sures, captured in the general disclosure score (GDi, t). Following Botosan (1997) and Jones 
(2007), the general disclosure score reflected the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants’ (AICPA) Jenkins Committee Report (1994), which contains reports on a study on 
the information needs of investors and creditors when they attempt to value firms. The gen-
eral disclosure score thus comprises several subcategories: management and shareholders, 
background information, financial and nonfinancial data, financial data over multiple years, 
and management’s analysis of financial and nonfinancial data. In line with Jones (2007), we 
award 2 points for disclosures made for the whole firm or at least segments comprising 75% 
of a firm’s sales. For disclosures about segments comprising less than 75% of a firm’s sales, 
we award 1 point. The complete list of items constituting the subcategories of the general dis-
closure score appears in the following table: 
 
Management and Shareholders Financial Data – Multiple Years of Information 
Major shareholders 
 
Return on assets or sufficient information to compute return 
  Executive management 
 
Net profit margin or sufficient information to compute net 
  Transactions with related parties 
 
Asset turnover or sufficient information to compute asset 
 Background Information 
 
Return on equity or sufficient information to compute return 
  Statement of corporate goals or objectives 
 
Summary of sales and net income for most recent eight 
  Barriers to entry discussed 
 
Separation of unusual or non-recurring items 
Competitive environment Management’s Analysis 
Description of industry including technological and regulatory en-
 
 
Change in sales 
 General description of business 
 
Change in operating income 
 Business risks and how/if those risks are hedged 
 
Change in cost of goods sold 
 Financial and Non-financial Data 
 
Change in gross profit 
Principle products 
 
Change in selling and administrative expenses 
Description of process used to make product including key inputs 
 
Change in interest expense 
Principle markets 
 
Change in interest income 
Location, nature, and extent of use of property and equipment 
 
Change in net income 
Planned capital expenditures 
 
Change in inventory 
 Number of employees 
 
Change in accounts receivable 
 Average compensation per employee 
 
Change in capital expenditures 
Volume and prices of materials 
 
Change in market share 
Time to produce or deliver goods 
 
Change in liquidity and financial flexibility 
 Changes in rate of production 
 
Discussion of trends affecting liquidity 
Order backlog Identification of funding sources 
 Percentage of sales in products designed in last five years Comparison of current performance to previously discussed    Market share 
 
Discussion of opportunities and risks associated with key 
  Units sold 
 
General expectation about coming year results 
Unit selling price 
 
 
Growth in units sold 
 
 
Employee satisfaction and/or relations with union  
R&D spending  
Research in progress  







WEB APPENDIX C 
We first determine the average number of reversals across all customer metrics between two 
fiscal years for each firm separately. Then, we calculate the average number of reversals be-
tween two fiscal years and across all customer metrics per firm. Finally, we divide this num-
ber by the total number of customer metrics (= 34), to yield the average share of actually im-
plemented reversals out of all possible reversals in disclosures of customer metrics between 
two fiscal years and per firm. Formally, 
 































 where:  
CSBD = Consistency Score of backward-looking disclosures of customer metrics, 
CSFD = Consistency Score of forward-looking disclosures of customer metrics, 
ict
BDv  = Binary variable that reflects if firm i discloses backward-looking information about customer metric c in year t,  
ict
FDv  = Binary variable that reflects if firm i discloses forward-looking information about customer metric c in year t,  
I = Index set of firms, 
C = Index set of customer metrics,  
Ti = Index set of years that are available for firm i,  
t_maxi = Highest year in index set T of firm i,  
I' = Number of elements in I, i.e., number of firms,  
C' = Number of elements in C, i.e., number of customer metrics,  
Ti' = Number of elements in Ti, i.e. number of years that are available for firm i.  
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WEB APPENDIX D 
FIRST STAGE RESULTS 
  Telecom (n = 192)   Airlines (n = 95)  
  BDi, t FDi, t General Disclosurei, t BDi, t FDi, t General Disclosurei, t 
  Coeff SE   Coeff SE   Coeff SE   Coeff SE   Coeff SE   Coeff SE   
Exclusion Restrictions                    
CMOi,t .01 .05  .15 .08 ** -.03 .03  .12 .04 *** -.05 .09  .00 .01  
BDi, t-1 .60 .07 *** .00 .12  .02 .05  .17 .10 * .42 .24 ** -.01 .03  
FDi, t-1 -.01 .05  .44 .08 *** .07 .03 ** .16 .06 *** .18 .14 * .00 .01  
General Disclosurei, t-1 .22 .10 ** -.10 .16  .39 .06 *** -.83 .48 ** .21 1.11  .32 .12 *** 
Other Controls                    
Analysts’ Uncertaintyi,t .01 .27  .77 .44 * .02 .17  -.20 .40  .76 .93  .00 .10  
Investor’ Uncertaintyi,t -2.17 1.31  -1.90 2.17  -.06 .83  .03 .04  .05 .09  .00 .01  
Cash-flowsi, t -.41 .37  -.25 .62  .23 .24  -.19 .29  -.44 .67  -.12 .07 * 
Earnings Surprisei, t .00 .07  -.11 .12  .02 .05  .16 .08 ** .22 .18  -.01 .02  
Volatilityi, t  -.13 .39  .76 .64  .35 .24  .01 .04  .04 .10  .00 .01  
Sizei, t .02 .03  .03 .05  .01 .02  -.01 .04  .24 .09 *** -.01 .01  
Leveragei, t .34 .28  -.34 .46  .19 .18  -1.00 .32 *** 1.54 .75 ** -.16 .08 ** 
Liquidityi, t -.16 .06 ** -.08 .11  -.02 .04  .03 .10  -.11 .22  -.01 .02  
Marketing Spendingi, t -.28 .34  .77 .56  .85 .21 *** .00 .45  .18 1.04  -.02 .11  
Number of Estimatesi, t .00 .04  .01 .06  .03 .02  .07 .07  .11 .16  -.01 .02  
Number of Segmentsi, t -.03 .03  -.04 .06  -.07 .02 *** -.03 .04  .03 .10  -.02 .01 ** 
Institutional Holdingi, t .01 .02  .01 .04  -.02 .01  .41 .22 * -.55 .52  -.01 .05  
Industry Concentrationt .70 .80  -1.52 1.32  .54 .51  -.33 .35  .57 .82  -.02 .09  
pre2008t .03 .08  -.11 .13  .06 .05  -.02 .05  -.17 .11  .00 .01  
GDPt .01 .01  .02 .02  .00 .01  .01 .01  -.03 .02  .00 .00  
Trendit .00 .01  -.02 .02  .00 .01  .01 .01  -.01 .02  .00 .00  
Constant -.29 .50  .36 .83  1.34 .32 *** 5.05 2.05 ** -2.92 4.74  3.03 .50 *** 
Fit Statistics                                     
F-Stat (57, 134) = 31.28 *** (57, 134) = 19.65 *** (57, 134) = 38.54 *** (34, 60) = 53.13 *** (34, 60) = 1.23 *** (34, 60) = 106.80 *** 
Adj R-Square   .90     .85     .92     .95     .77     .98   
Notes: Each model contains firm-specific fixed effects. Coeff = Coefficient; SE = Standard Error; CMOi,t = Chief Marketing Officer Presence for firm ‘i’ at year ‘t’  (=1 if the firm has a Chief Marketing Officer, else =0); 
BDi, t = Quantity of Backward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics; FDi, t = Quantity of Forward-Looking Disclosures of Customer Metrics; * = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01 (1-tailed for hypothesized varia-
bles, else 2-tailed). Consistent with Muslu et al. (2015), all variables were log-transformed. 
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WEB APPENDIX E 
FORWARD-LOOKING DISCLOSURES OF CUSTOMER METRICS: 
CONSIDERING FIRM ACTIONS AND CUSTOMER OUTCOMES SEPERATELY 
 
 Telecommunications Industry Airlines Industry 
Firm Actions  Marketing Spending 
Perceived Quality 
Customer Retention Costs 
Cross Selling Rate 
Advertising Spending 



















Average Revenue Per User 
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